



GESY

Governance and The Efficiency of Economic Systems

Newsletter

Sonderforschungsbereich Transregio 15 • A cooperation of: FU Berlin • HU Berlin • Universität Bonn • Universität Mannheim • ZEW Mannheim • LMU München

Newsletter No. 1

January 2010

SFB/TR 15 Seminars

Berlin		
Date	Speaker (Institution)	Title
December 14	Sven Seuken, Harvard University	"Market Design & Analysis for a P2P Backup System"
January 11	Kohei Kawamura, University of Edinburgh	"Eliciting Information from the Public"
January 18	Gilardi, University of Zurich	"Delegation to independent regulatory agencies and its consequences"
January 25	Jos Jansen, Max Planck Institute	"tba"
Bonn		
Date	Speaker (Institution)	Title
January 12	Dennis Gärtner, University of Zurich	"tba"
January 19	Daniel Cerquera, ZEW	"Recommended Retail Prices and Collusion in Pharma Markets: The Case of ED Drugs"
Munich		
Date	Speaker (Institution)	Title
January 11	Stefan Trautmann, Tilburg University	"tba"
January 12	Helmut Bester, FU Berlin	"Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market"
January 18	Oliver Falck, ifo Institut	"tba"
January 19	Christian Keuschnigg, University of St. Gallen	"tba"
January 25	Ted Temzelides, Rice University	"tba"
January 26	Volker Wieland, University of Frankfurt	"tba"

External Research Visits, Lectures and Seminars of SFB/TR 15 Members

A4 (Rady/Schmidt)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Klaus Schmidt	Screening, Competition and Job Design University of Regensburg	December 7
Joachim Winter	RAND, Santa Monica, USA	December 17 - 19
B5 (Marin/Schnitzer)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Monika Schnitzer	Productivity Program Meeting, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA (talk: "Financial Constraints and Innovation: Why poor countries don't catch up (joint with Yuriy Gorodnichenko)")	December 3 - 4
C5 (Kamecke/Röller)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Tomaso Duso	Paris-Nanterre , France (talk: "Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An empirical Assessment")	January 25

External seminars

A4 (Rady / Schmidt)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Joachim Winter	Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, United Kingdom	November 30
B3 (Hellwig)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Jos Jansen	On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly, University of Paris, Paris France	December 11

Publications

A4 (Rady/Schmidt)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Lothar Essig (joint with Joachim Winter)	"Item nonresponse to financial questions in household surveys: An experimental study of interviewer and mode effects", Fiscal Studies, 367-390 , Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Ltd	December
C5 (Kamecke/Röller)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Robert C. Schmidt (joint with Robert Marschinski)	"A model of technological breakthrough in the renewable energy sector", Ecological Economics, 435-444	forthcoming
C6 (Peitz/Stahl)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler	Strategic Communication Networks	forthcoming

New Discussion Papers

A5 (Schweizer/von Hagen)		
Name	Title	Number
Alexander Stremitzer	<p>New Version: Opportunistic Termination</p> <p><i>Abstract:</i> If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to contract, European and US warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer may use non-conformity as a pretext for getting rid of a contract he no longer wants. We show that this possibility of 'opportunistic termination' might actually have positive effects. Under some circumstances, it will lead to redistribution in favour of the buyer without any loss of efficiency. Moreover, by curbing the monopoly power of the seller, a regime involving termination might increase welfare by enabling a more efficient output level in a setting with multiple buyers.</p> <p><i>JEL classification:</i> K12, C7, L40, D30</p>	226

Alexander Stremitzer, Avraham Tabbach (NA)	Insolvency and Biased Standards - The Case for Proportional Liability <i>Abstract:</i> We analyze liability rules in a setting where injurers are potentially insolvent and where negligence standards may deviate from the socially optimal level. We show that proportional liability, which sets the measure of damages equal to the harm multiplied by the probability that it was caused by an injurer's negligence, is preferable to other existing negligence-based rules. Moreover, proportional liability outperforms strict liability if the standard of due care is not set too low. Our analysis also suggests that courts should rely on statistical evidence and bar individualized causal claims that link the harm suffered by a plaintiff to the actions of the defendant. Finally, we provide a result which might be useful to regulators when calculating minimum capital requirements or minimum mandatory insurance for different industries. Classification-JEL: K13	289
Richard Brooks(NA), Alexander Stremitzer	On and Off Contract Remedies <i>Abstract:</i> A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) "affirm" the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or (ii) "disaffirm" the contract with the remedy of rescission and restitution. This simple dichotomy of contract remedies applies broadly in both common law and civil law practice. We show here that this remedial regime allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments. JEL-Classification: K12, L22, J41, C70	290

New/Leaving Staff

C2 (Harhoff/Stahl)		
Name	Topic	Dates
Patrick Beschorner	is leaving project C2 (ZEW, Mannheim) to start a new position in Dortmund as of January 1 st 2010	December 31

Miscellaneous

C6 (Peitz/Stahl)		
Name	Topic	Date
Christina Strassmair	Promotion	November 18

SFB/TR 15 Newsletter speaker: Prof. Urs Schweizer. editorial: Corinna Lehmann, 53111 Bonn.
 URL: <http://www.sfbtr15.de>, phone 0228/73-7931, fax 0228/73-6884, e-mail: c.lehmann@uni-bonn.de, editorial deadline for SFB/TR 15 newsletter No. 2: Wednesday, January 27th, 2010